Baudrillard's nihilism and the end of theory by King, Anthony
89
Baudrillard’s Nihilism and the End of Theory
Anthony King
The key question today is how to maintain a “critical” position in the
face of dramatic global transformations which seem to absorb all opposi-
tion. The failure of 1968, the decomposition of the working class and their
unions, the collapse of Soviet Communism in 1989 and the growing
acceptance of neo-liberal thinking makes the end of this millennium a dif-
ficult time to be radical. This may not be the end of history as Fukuyama
claimed, but it threatens to be the end of critique. Within this new context,
radical intellectuals are now unsure of where the battle-lines are or even
what kind of war they should be fighting. Yet Critical Theory has never
been more necessary, for the very reason that all opposition seems to be
incorporated into the system. It is now, with the apparent collapse of cri-
tique, that the curious case of Jean Baudrillard becomes relevant.
Although his earlier writings rejected Marxism as not radical enough
because it was always already trapped within capitalist categories, Baud-
rillard has been overwhelmed by the emergence of global capitalism and
the demise of Marxism. In the context of this postmodern order, he has
renounced all critique and, instead, opted for nihilism. Although this
nihilism is extreme, it is not completely idiosyncratic1 and, consequently,
it usefully points to where Critical Theory went wrong. Baudrillard’s later
1. Arthur Kroker and Debra Cook, The Postmodern Scene (London: Macmillan,
1988); Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 1988), would
be examples of this nihilism. Alex Callincos’ Against Postmodernism (Cambridge: Polity,
1991), Christopher Norris’ What’s Wrong with Postmodernism? (London: Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1990), Steven Best and Douglas Kellner’s Postmodern Theory (London:
Macmillan, 1991), and Douglas Kellner’s Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmod-
ernism and Beyond (Cambridge: Polity, 1991) similarly see this nihilism as widespread. 
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writings demonstrate exactly what critical theorists must not do. His ear-
lier writings, echoing the work of Adorno and Horkheimer, suggest ways
to think against the current hegemony. 
Baudrillard’s Early Period: The Critique of Industrial Capitalism
Maintaining that Marx’s critical project failed, because it did not go
far enough, Baudrillard first sought to subvert industrial capitalism
through a critique of the ideology of production, use and exchange value.2
Despite his intentions, Marx himself uncritically employed the very con-
cepts of labor, production and use-value which were fundamental to capi-
talism and therefore, supported the very order whose dissolution his
writing sought. “Failing to conceive of a mode of social wealth other than
that founded on labor and production, Marxism no longer furnishes in the
long run a real alternative to capitalism.”3 For Marx, the problem with
labor under capitalism was that it failed to live up to the definition pro-
vided by capitalism. The objective quantity of work put into commodities
was disguised by the fetishism of the commodity, but Marx never ques-
tioned capitalism’s claim that labor had an objective value. Rather, the
problem was that capitalism obscured that objective value, so that work-
ers earned less than their labor was objectively worth and were thus
exploited. Baudrillard’s key claim is that labor is never objective, but
always culturally defined, and that turning labor into something with an
objectively discernible economic value, which no one can dispute and
which is ‘fair’, is already a crucial step in the establishment of capitalist
hegemony. Critical Theory must go beyond Marx to see that claims to
material objectivity are themselves part of capitalist hegemony. Once the
objective productivity of labor is accepted, Critical Theory has already
lost most of its theoretical leverage, conceding as obvious one of the cen-
tral mechanisms by which the order is established and legitimated. Con-
ceding that the value of labor is objective means that it is beyond political
negotiation. Consequently, the objectivity of labor is a central element in
capitalism’s disarticulation of economics from politics.
Writing over a century later, Baudrillard was able to see beyond these
2. Baudrillard’s early period refers both to the period from the late 1960s to about
the mid-1970s and includes his first four books Les Système des Object (Paris: Denoel,
1968); La Societé de Consommation (Paris: Gallimard, 1970); Pour une Critique de
l’Economie Politique du Signe (Paris: Gallimard, 1972); and Le Miroir de la Production
(Tournail: Casterman, 1973).
3. Jean Baudrillard, The Mirror of Production, tr. by Mark Poster (St.Louis: Telos
Press, 1975), p. 29.
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concepts. In place of Marxist categories of use and exchange value, labor,
production and alienation, he deployed anthropological accounts of prim-
itive societies as a resource for the radical critique of capitalism. In partic-
ular, he employed notions of sacrifice, symbolic exchange, duel, gift,
ambiguity, challenge and reversibility. In contrast to the economic cate-
gories of capitalism, and despite capitalism’s claims of naturalism and
inevitability, he emphasized symbolic exchanges found in gift exchange
in primitive cultures as the real universal economic categories.
In contrasting the exchange systems of other cultures with capitalism,
Baudrillard drew on the anthropological tradition and, in particular, the
writings of Mauss4 and Sahlins5 concerning the gift. He highlights the gift
economy in contrast to capitalism because, in the gift economy,
exchanges are always symbolic and, from this, he concludes that there
are, in fact, no objective systems of production and exchange but all sys-
tems of production are always symbolic. As Georges Bataille argued,
there is no such thing as an economy of necessity — there is always sur-
plus, the extent and nature of which is the result of socio-political
arrangements. In addition, the symbolism of exchange means that it
always represents the individual and his relations. Furthermore, in non-
capitalist cultures, the gift is always a challenge which threatens the sub-
ordination of the receiver if the receiver cannot reciprocate. Therefore, the
gift is always ambiguous. By contrast, in capitalist political economy, the
meaningfulness of the gift (which is an expression of personal relations
and contains both elements of friendship and challenge) is reduced to gen-
erality. “All ambivalence is reduced by equivalence.”6 In place of that
equivalence, Baudrillard demands the return to a symbolic economy,
which allows the possibility of individualistic relations.
The anthropology of the gift provides Baudrillard with a powerful crit-
ical perspective on capitalism, because it enables him to turn capitalism’s
claim for the universality and priority of its categories on its head. Thus he
asks: “Are we always within the capitalist mode of production? If the
answer is yes, then we readily accept the classical Marxist analysis. Are we
within a later mode, so different in its structure, in its contradictions and in
its mode of revolution, that one must distinguish it radically from capital-
ism (while maintaining that it is always a question of a mode of production
4. Marcel Mauss, The Gift, tr. by W. D. Hall (London: Routledge, 1990).
5. Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (London: Tavistock, 1974).
6. Jean Baudrillard, Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings, ed. by Mark Poster
(Cambridge: Polity, 1988).
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which is determinant as such)? Are we, quite simply, within a mode of pro-
duction at all and have we ever been in one?” 7 Baudrillard’s anthropologi-
cal insights allow him to see that it is not that every other economic form is
a capitalist mode of production in disguise and that the political economic
categories of capitalism are universal, but rather that capitalism itself is a
form of symbolic exchange — even if it denies its true nature. Instead of
accepting capitalist concepts at face value, in these early writings Baudril-
lard situates them anthropologically. Through this contextualization, he
reveals the inadequacy of the particular capitalist concepts to the reality
they describe. They are partial, because they are politically motivated, thus
the putatively impartial and obvious objectivity of labor becomes the exact
opposite — a symbolic cultural achievement of a particular class in human
history whose achievement is crucial to that class’ hegemony.
Baudrillard and the Frankfurt School
Baudrillard’s early period culminates in the radical Critical Theory of
The Mirror of Production and, although Baudrillard does not acknowl-
edge it, the parallels between his own critique of capitalism, the work of
the Frankfurt School, and Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlight-
enment in particular, is striking. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkhe-
imer and Adorno argue that the Enlightenment rejected the mimetic
mythological thinking of previous cultures in favor of a scientific
method.8 The mythical thought of pre-capitalist societies represented the
variety of nature with a pantheon of idols and gods, each of which sym-
bolized one aspect of the natural world. These representations were obvi-
ously inadequate, inevitably excluding important aspects of their object.
By contrast, science rejects representation and meaning and looks to the
object as an example of statistical laws; as mere examples of a universal
and, therefore as eminently interchangeable. Yet, although science
demands that it has put an end to mythological and mimetic thought,
Horkheimer and Adorno argue that science’s rejection of mythology is
deluded. All thinking is finally mythological because thinking is always
conceptual and all concepts have to represent their object. Furthermore,
since concepts are mimetic, they are always inadequate to their object.
There are always features which escape representation. The inescapable
inadequacy of concepts to the reality they describe is the central theme of
7.  Baudrillard, The Mirror of Production, op. cit., p. 124.
8. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, tr. by John
Cumming (London: Allen Lane, 1973), p. 5
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Adorno’s entire philosophy and is discussed at length in his Negative Dia-
lectics.9 Consequently, critical social theorists develop their position
through a continual consideration of the gap between the concept and the
object, and this eternal consideration transforms both object and concept
in an upward dialectical spiral of increasing self-consciousness. The
object is never known immediately, but only through the mediation of
concepts. Thus, for Adorno, “dialectics is the consistent sense of noniden-
tity. It does not begin by taking a standpoint.”10 Rather, dialectics or Crit-
ical Theory is only the negative process of deconstructing what is being
thought. Of course, as Adorno recognized, in the end, something positive
has to be reached and some standpoint adopted if anything is to be said at
all, but this should only be at the end of a long process, fully conscious of
the fact that this standpoint is inevitably insufficient and temporary. By
contrast, scientific thinking rejects the inadequacy of the concept and
demands direct access to nature. This demand for direct access is mysti-
fied, because that knowledge of nature is always mediated by concepts
and, in the end, scientific thought is merely a form of mythological
thought, but one which dare not speak its name.
The resemblance between Baudrillard’s early writings and Dialectic
of Enlightenment emerges with particular clarity when Horkheimer and
Adorno connect scientific thought with the bourgeois capitalist economy.
“With the extension of the bourgeois commodity economy, the dark hori-
zon of myth is illumined by the sun of calculating reason, beneath whose
cold rays the seed of the new barbarism grows to fruition.”11 This new
barbarism is the reduction of all individuals and all individual exchanges
to dead equivalence. Like the rabbits of scientific experiment, the indi-
vidual in the market is a mere example of a general statistical law. As
Baudrillard argues, not only is the reduction of individual exchange to a
universal formula tyrannous, stifling self-expression and development,
but like science, it is an illusion. “The dismissal of sacrifice by the ratio-
nality of self-preservation is exchange no less than sacrifice itself was.
The identically persistent self which arises in the abrogation of sacrifice
immediately becomes an unyielding, rigidified sacrificial ritual that man
celebrates upon himself by opposing his consciousness to the natural
9.  His introductory claim to that book can be taken as an aphorism for his entire
critical method: “The name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, than that objects do
not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder” Theodor W. Adorno, Negative
Dialectics, tr. by E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1990), p. 5.
10.  Ibid.
11. Horkheimer and Adorno, op. cit., p. 32.
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context.”12 Paralleling science, political economy insists that it has elim-
inated the spirit of the gift and washed economic exchange of any indi-
viduality. In fact, all exchanges necessarily involve the embodiment of
the giver but, within the capitalist economy, giver and receiver are
reduced to enslaved, undeveloping selves. 
Despite Baudrillard’s failure to refer to Horkheimer and Adorno’s
work, his early efforts follow a similar path. Like Horkheimer and Adorno,
he criticizes capitalist categories from the viewpoint of mythological cul-
tures. Capitalism is only one form of symbolic exchange, but one whose
categories deny this symbolism, insisting on an apolitical and materialist
objectivism. The dismissal of capitalism’s claims to be different, through a
consideration of other cultures, strips away capitalism’s aura of objectivity,
undermining the explicitly political interests which are invested in the cap-
italist order but are disguised by appeals to universality and objectivity.
Global Capitalism and Hyperreality
Confronted with the emergence of global capitalism, Baudrillard
trades his Critical Theory in for nihilism, because he sees this postmodern
capitalism as a fundamental cultural transformation. Unlike his earlier
work, where capitalism was seen to be just another form of symbolic
exchange, he now begins to believe global capitalism’s own self-defini-
tion. He no longer situates this form of capitalism within a historical con-
text, but absolutizes it. He sees the emergence of hyperreality, the
implosion of external reality into a series of images, as the defining fea-
ture of this transformation. “The real does not efface itself in favor of the
imaginary; it effaces itself in favor of the more real than real: the hyper-
real. The truer than true: this is simulation.”13
Hyperreality emerges when culture no longer refers to a social reality.
Hyperreal culture is not grounded in a reality beyond itself; images float
free from any verifying reference, becoming an un-anchored “reality.”
The signifier and signified become detached, and the signifier effaces the
signified. Hyperreality marks the end of representation, because represen-
tation becomes reality and, in this, differs profoundly from any previous
culture. Baudrillard’s early writing already distinguished capitalism’s
self-definition from the symbolic exchanges of “primitive society.” In
these societies, symbolic exchanges occur in sacrifice or in gifts, which
12. Horkheimer and Adorno, op. cit., p. 54.
13. Jean Baudrillard, Fatal Strategies, tr. by Philip Beitchman and W. G. J. Neislu-
chowksi (New York: Semiotext(e), 1990), p. 11.
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are images of the reality they represent. In modern capitalism, this sym-
bolism is stultified and exchanges are no longer mythically representative
but rather merely mirror the objective value of what is to be exchanged.
Despite the self-denials, there is an impoverished form of representation,
where that representation is deadened into mere equivalence. In order to
communicate this stultified representationalism of modern capitalism,
Baudrillard talks of maps, doubles and mirrors, where the signifier and
signified become exactly equivalent with no room for difference.
With global capitalism, a radical transformation occurs in which
there is no longer any representation. The representation effaces the real-
ity and the representation is all that remains. In place of the dull and
equivalent exchange and use values of the modern period, the signifiers
of postmodernity signify nothing but themselves. According to Baudril-
lard, this hyperreal culture is generated by television, for the images on
the television screen do not have any external referents, even deadened
ones. In order to describe this new hyperreal culture, Baudrillard devel-
ops an idiosyncratic lexicon of terms, which stand as metaphors for this
new televisual culture.14 For him, the word “scene” refers to the period
of modern (mirror-stage) capitalism when representations are still linked
to reality. Consequently, the scene can be interpreted. It can be compared
to something else in order to point out its inadequacies. The screen
replaces this scene and brings about the end of interpretation.15 It is auto-
matically decoded in the receiver’s mind without any mediation. The
process of reading, interpretation and internalization is abolished, and the
viewer receives an unmediated message just as the pianola plays music
14. He writes: “For information and the media are not a scene, a prospective space,
or something that’s performed, but a screen without depth, a tape perforated with mes-
sages and signals to which corresponds a receiver’s own perforated reading.” Ibid, p. 65.
15. Alongside the term “screen,” Baudrillard deploys a whole series of words which
refer to this same hyperreal phenomenon of the obliteration of the signified by the signi-
fier. Thus, hyperreality is termed “obscene” or “obese” because it is no longer a scene but
is bloated on itself. It is described as a “simulation” or “simulacrum,” because these
bloated images are so real and vivid, or Baudrillard refers to it as “metastasis,” “code,”
“clone,” “matrix,” “hologram” or “moebius strip,” because these images are utterly self-
referential, reproducing themselves exactly, untroubled by external referents. Since exter-
nal reality is obliterated beyond “realer than real” images, the television is free to represent
the world in whatever way it chooses and no one is capable of subverting that absolute
domination because no one any longer has access to the real world as a reference point.
Thus, although, Baudrillard reneges upon his early connection with the Frankfurt School,
his bleak political vision of hyperreal culture accords closely with the pessimism of
Adorno and Horkheimer’s writing for, in both, political cooption is all but universal while
personal autonomy, self-development and, therefore, freedom are all but extinguished.
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automatically without the active participation of the pianist. Today’s world
is one of vivid representations which, however, have nothing beyond them. 
Baudrillard’s Terrorism
In the light of hyperreality and our increasing domination by free-
floating images, traditional forms of critique have become obsolete. Dia-
lectical critique demonstrates the deliberate and politically motivated
inadequacy of the concepts of dominant groups by pointing out the gap
between the way those concepts represent social reality and the nature of
that social reality, even though that social reality is itself never finally
objective but always constructed. In the context of hyperreality, however,
there is allegedly no social reality — even a constructed one — in which
to situate hegemonic concepts and demonstrate their inadequacy. Frag-
mented images of the television screen, uncoupled from social reality,
have become “realer than real.” There is no context outside the screen or,
as Baudrillard would say, there is no scene, but only obscene images.
Since critical analysis operates by means of interpretation, at one
stage removed from social reality, Critical Theory assists in the emer-
gence of hyperreality. Academic theories are mere interpretations of a
hyperreality already separated from social reality. Thus they themselves
become simulacra, doubly removed from life. In the attempt to justify
themselves, academic theories do not render their explanations more con-
vincing but lose sight of the very object of study. “The frenzy to explain
everything, attribute everything, footnote everything. All this becomes a
fantastic encumbrance — the references all living off each other and at
each other’s expense. An excrescent system of interpretation develops
with no relations to its object. All this comes from a headlong flight for-
ward from the hemorrhage of objective causality.”16 Thus, the academy
compounds the problem. Academia becomes self-referential through its
need for theoretical validation and, consequently, the object (hyperreality)
disappears from view. Dialectical critique never even starts to confront
hyperreality but only adds to it.
As a result, Baudrillard turns his back on Critical Theory, insisting
that “the dialectical stage, the critical stage is empty.”17 A new method
of resistance must be developed, which Baudrillard calls “terrorism”
and by which he seems to mean violent political action and the taking
16. Baudrillard, Fatal Strategies, op. cit., p.12-13. 
17. Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, tr. by Sheila Glaser (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan, 1994), p. 161
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up of arms against a sea of simulacrum. Academics, however, can wage
a more sedate form of terror. “I am a terrorist and nihilist in theory as
the others are with their weapons. Theoretical violence, not truth, is the
only resource left us.”18 In calling for terrorism, Baudrillard begins his
aphoristic and anti-academic phase. Bryan Turner has defended this
strategy and has argued that Baudrillard’s difficult and fragmentary
style is designed not to analyze contemporary society in a usual aca-
demic manner, but rather to communicate an understanding of that soci-
ety through textual imitation.19 “Baudrillard can be admired and praised
for capturing this postmodern experience of flaneurism through the pro-
duction of sociological fiction. . . . The disorder of the maxims thus pro-
vide a perfect simulation of the disorder of society.”20
Like the simulacra Baudrillard describes, these texts have no apparent
reference point, but leap from subject to subject (as viewers jump from
channel to channel) and are mutually inconsistent, even incoherent. These
writings are “terroristic,” because they force readers to experience the sti-
fling incoherence of a culture of simulacra. They terrorize them, forcing
them to acknowledge the true nature of their culture. Through the infuriat-
ing bewilderment the later texts cause them, those readers will be driven
to oppose hyperreality itself. If Baudrillard is still serious about his own
political radicalness and the subversiveness of his texts, then this is the
objective he pursues in his later writings.21
In the context of hyperreality, theory must no longer try to represent
the object it seeks to explain and critique. That is the failure of both Fou-
cault and Deleuze, whom Baudrillard criticizes for sustaining a traditional
notion of reality. Theory must become its own reality by cutting itself off
from external reality, from “its term,” and making itself dizzy by turning
18. Ibid. p. 163.
19. Bryan Turner, ‘Cruising America’ in Forget Baudrillard? ed. by Chris Rojek,
Chris and Bryan Turner (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 154.
20.  Ibid, pp. 154 and 157.
21. In an interview with Baudrillard, Sylvére Lotringer sums up the objective of
“hyperreal” theory. “SL: ‘You’ve cut yourself off from every system of reference, but not
from referentiality. What I see you describing is not a challenge to the real but a challenge
internal to theory. You don’t criticize the genealogical attitude or libidinal position, you
send them spinning away like tops. You wholly embrace the movement that animates
them, you amplify their concepts to the maximum, pulling them into the vortex of your
own dizziness. You draw them into an endless spiral which, like the treatment of myth by
Levi-Strauss, leads them bit by bit to their own exhaustion.’ JB: ‘That’s right. Thus theory
is exterminated. It no longer has any term, literally. You can’t find an end for it any-
more’.” Jean Baudrillard, Forget Foucault, tr. by Nicole Dufresne, Philip Beitchman, Lee
Hildreth and Mark Polizzotti (New York: Semiotext(e), 1987), p. 131-2.
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in on itself (just like hyperreality). It can no longer be interpretative,
explanatory or representative as it was before hyperreality. “From that
point on, theory maintains absolutely no relation with anything at all; it
becomes an event in and of itself.”22 Once theory becomes deliberately
and consciously self-referential and autonomous, just as television images
are separated from the reality which they have taken over, it becomes a
useful critical tool again. In dismissing reality, theory graphically com-
municates to the reader a feeling of a void and thereby the dizziness
which is induced by hyperreality.23 In performing this un-mediated com-
munication of hyperreality, theory becomes “suicidal, but in a good
way.”24 It turns on itself, but in self-destructing like a kamikaze, it aims to
sink the titanic hulk of post-Fordist hyperreality. The meaning of Baudril-
lard’s initially obscure demand for the revenge of the object (“crystal
revenge,” as he sometimes calls it) becomes clear in the light of the role
he assigns to theory. Its attempt to communicate the hyperreal immedi-
ately can be described as a return to and the revenge of the object itself.
“The pure object is sovereign because it is what breaks up the sovereignty
of the other and catches it in its own trap. The crystal takes revenge.”25 
In communicating hyperreality directly, Baudrillard’s later writings
seek to pass the traditional sovereignty of the subject over to the object.
Like hyperreality, the crystal is transparent, but it is impossible to see any-
thing through it. It merely refracts light, so that in examining it one does not
see a reality beyond it, as if it were a pane of glass, but only images of the
different edges of the crystal reflected by itself. The notion of “crystal
revenge” is, then, a shibboleth for all of Baudrillard’s later writings,
wherein he seeks to obviate the failings of traditional critique in order to
communicate hyperreality directly. He wants to allow this crystalline object
to speak for itself, since any subjective intervention or interpretation merely
assists the growth of this object. In a world where there is no outside, the
subject is rendered powerless. Traditional critique, which seeks to under-
mine hegemonic ideas by demonstrating their inadequacy to the social real-
ity they putatively describe, and which was central to Baudrillard’s early
writings, become irrelevant because there is no external social reality.
22. Ibid., p. 127.
23. Ibid., pp. 128-9. “If theory — or a poem, or any other kind of writing (it’s not
endemic to theory) — indeed manages to implode, to constitute a concentric vortex of
implosion, then there are no other effects of meaning. Theory has an immediate effect — a
very material one as well — of being a void. It’s not so easy to create a void.”
24.  Ibid., p. 128
25. Baudrillard, Fatal Strategies, op. cit., p. 114.
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The Self-delusion of Baudrillard’s Terrorism
For Baudrillard’s later writings to be sustainable, two conditions have
to be met. First, Baudrillard’s terrorism — his attempt to communicate
hyperreality to the reader immediately, allowing the crystal its revenge —
must be theoretically coherent and possible. Second, his description of
hyperreality as a unique transformation of culture, in which an external
social reality is eclipsed in the vivid representations of the screen, must be
an accurate account of recent developments.
The most sympathetic reading of Baudrillard’s later writings is to read
them as literature, as Turner and Mike Gane do.26 This is a legitimate strat-
egy so long as what is produced is literature. In other words, in demanding
that he is no longer writing sociology, Baudrillard is committing himself to
being judged by the equally rigorous, though different standards, which are
applied to creative prose. This is where he falls into difficulties, for his later
writing cannot really be said to be creative prose. They retain their aca-
demic form and still seek to provide a commentary on hyperreality. They
do not open up a fragmented world, but rather stand back from that world,
offering detached criticisms and generalizations about it. Baudrillard does
not communicate the vertiginous flicking from one television channel to
the other, but comments on the meaning of these changing images.
Like the academic he remains, Baudrillard makes claims about the
general features of this culture, rather than using narrative to communicate
a message, as is typical in literature. Moreover, there is no divide between
Baudrillard and the narrative itself; there is no ironic use of character or
detachment from the text. His writing is merely an earnest but stripped
form of academic writing, which moves from asserted claim to claim,
rather than from sustained claim to claim for the slow but rigorous building
of an argument.27 Once his obscure lexicon is deciphered, and readers real-
ize that by “code” and “matrix” Baudrillard refers to the fact that hyperreal
culture simply lives off itself, never coupling with a reality beyond itself,
then his sentences become assertive and static. The only point he makes is
26. See Mike Gane, Baudrillard: Critical and Fatal Theory (London: Routledge,
1991), pp. 179-181. Unlike academic writing, this literature does not stand back from its
subject but draws the reader imaginarily into the world it describes through the creation of
a text which echoes that world.
27. Typically, he comments on rather than describes hyperreal culture: “The Father
and the Mother have disappeared, not in the service of aleatory liberty of the subject, but
in the service of a matrix called code. No more mother, no more father: a matrix. And it is
the matrix, that of genetic code, that now infinitely ‘gives birth’ based on a functional
mode purged of all aleatory sexuality. The subject is also gone, since identical duplication
puts an end to this division.” See Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, op. cit., pp. 96-7.
100 ANTHONY KING
that television culture is hyperreal — signifiers now float free — and the
only way in which this sentence communicates that point is by positing
these crude metaphors of “code” and “matrix.” Stylistically, Baudrillard’s
terrorism baldly states that contemporary culture is like a hologram, a code,
a matrix or clone, because it is wholly self-referential but it does not actu-
ally communicate what it is like to experience this culture.
Compare this style of writing with J. G. Ballard’s Crash — a novel
providing a very successful (and deliberately obscene) description of post-
modern culture. It recognizes that culture’s bodily indulgence, and knows
that it does not liberate the individual but reduces the body to a machine for
pleasure, just as the car is a machine for speech. The car-crash and the sex-
act are the moments when the wholly technical machineries of the car and
the bodies are decomposed in an instant of pain that is transformed (for
ironic effect) into one of intense pleasure for the perverts who populate the
book. In communicating this new, debased ethic of bodily pleasure, where
the delight in bodily mutilation parallels a correlating spiritual disfigure-
ment, Ballard describes a questionnaire about car crashes which Vaughan,
the central figure in the book, has prepared and which lists every conceiv-
able injury: “Lastly came that group of injuries which had clearly most pre-
occupied Vaughan — genital wounds caused during automobile accidents.
. . . the breasts of teenage girls deformed by instrument binnacles, the par-
tial mammoplasties of elderly housewives carried out by chromium lou-
vres of windshield assemblies, nipples sectioned by manufacturers’
dashboard medallions; injuries to male and female genitalia caused by
steering wheel shrouds, windshields during ejection, crushed door pillars,
seat springs and handbrake units, cassette player instrument toggles.”28
The descriptions Ballard provides of both cars and bodies are wholly tech-
nical and anatomical, emphasizing that, in this culture, both “bodyworks”
are (obscenely) reduced to the same level. Against Ballard’s rich, self-
developing text, Baudrillard’s writing is flat and strained. He simply
breaks down his academic text into aphoristic gobblets and draws on a
28. J. G. Ballard, Crash (London: Vintage, 1995), pp. 133-4. Crash is used deliber-
ately, since Baudrillard himself has referred to it as providing a commentary on postmod-
ern culture. Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, op. cit., pp. 111-19. The most
effective use of this stylistic technique in this passage is Ballard’s use of the phrase “wind-
shield during ejection,” where the image of sexual orgasm and the lethal propulsion of
passengers out of the car are superimposed. In addition, since the extensive listing of dif-
ferent types of injury reduces the meaning of each, Ballard is ironically able to mount a
critique of a culture which sees no value in anything beyond the technical operation of
sexual excitement and ejaculation, which is equivalent to a “windshield ejection.”
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lexicon of dead, static metaphors. In the end, Baudrillard falls between
the two stools of demanding that academic writing is inadequate to the
analysis of hyperreality, but still writing according to its conventions and
thereby vitiating either the academic or the literary merit of his later work.
However, even if Baudrillard wanted his later writing to be read as litera-
ture and even if he had been successful in producing text which could be
judged as literature, the project of this later writing would still have been
irretrievably self-deluded. Even if his terrorism were a successful form of
literature, it could never (as he claims) communicate hyperreality to the
reader directly, for all writing is necessarily mediated; all writing is an
interpretation.29 Unavoidably, his terroristic writing is an interpretation of
hyperreal culture, which does not obviate the necessity of interpretation,
however directly it tries to communicate hyperreality.
In insisting on representing hyperreality directly, Baudrillard does not,
as he claims, present a clearer idea of hyperreality but, on the contrary (and
ironically), a less illuminating and less direct one. As a result of his
demand to present hyperreality directly, he simply stops at the first point of
the interpretive process and presents his initial assumptions as the defini-
tive statement on contemporary culture. Thus, he does not provide a
clearer insight into the true nature of televisual culture but rather obscures
the role of television with an assertive and arrogant hypostatization of an
immediate concept. His terrorism halts the dialectical process at its first
and most inadequate initial point, before the critical process has begun.
Instead of developing his concepts through a thorough immersion in
“hyperreal” culture, refining his interpretation to make it more adequate to
that object, Baudrillard reifies his first impressions into absolute truths. In
breaking off the dialectical engagement with the actual social practices of
postmodern culture, he hypostatizes his crude standpoint into “the truth.”
Ironically, in trying to present hyperreality immediately, Baudrillard
falls into exactly the same error for which he so effectively criticized Marx.
Just as Marx failed to provide a truly radical alternative to capitalism by
employing the concepts of capitalist political economy, Baudrillard’s
29. Baudrillard’s demand that his later writings achieve the impossible feat of becom-
ing non-textual text cannot be met and, in the end, replicates the same error as Artaud’s
failed “theater of cruelty.” Artaud rejected classical bourgeois theater, which sought only to
represent real life, because it thereby lost its critical power over that life. With his “theater
of cruelty,” Artaud insisted on going directly to the life he sought to communicate:
“Restored to its absolute and terrifying proximity, the stage of cruelty will thus return me to
the autarchic immediacy of my birth, my body and my speech.” Jacques Derrida, Writing
and Difference, translated by Alan Bass (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1990), p.190.
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fragmented aphorisms are unable to provide a critical alternative to hyper-
reality, because they are so thoroughly embedded inand dependent on the
very cultural forms they are intended to oppose. The fragmentation of
Baudrillard’s later writing does not serve the critical purpose for which it
was intended, but rather, if it has any effect, it sensitizes the reader to the
global media culture Baudrillard wanted to resist. His attempt to portray a
culture in which allegedly there is no longer any reality beyond its repre-
sentations, is the academic extension of that culture. Contrary to his own
intentions, it is the very intellectual path he has insisted on taking, which
turns its back on careful research and close critical analysis, which makes
the desert of hyperreality grow. It robs the reader of any critical under-
standing of contemporary culture. Moreover, it denies the importance of
developing alternative knowledge and understandings, which would
undermine media representations of the world because it asserts that these
alternative visions would always already be incorporated into hyperreal-
ity. It is not enough simply to say that television is a false reality; one
must try and reconstruct a reality in which political freedom and critique
are possible, even though any constructed reality must itself always be
subjected to critique. Consequently, against Baudrillard, an appropriate
form of academic resistance would be to insist upon even more rigorously
researched and detailed work.30 In particular, the dialectical method
which demands the constant overhaul of concepts, whereby nothing is
taken for granted, would have prevented Baudrillard from falling into the
hyperbolic reification of mere assertions.
The Fictitiousness of Hyperreality
In severing the dialectical process of interpretation at its first and most
assertive point and in raising his most cursory impressions of television
culture to a definitive analysis of that culture, Baudrillard seriously mis-
represents the transformations which have occurred over the last three
decades. Baudrillard’s notion of hyperreality cannot be defended as an
account of recent cultural transformations, although he is undoubtedly cor-
rect to point to the importance of television as a central element in contem-
porary culture. It is a startling development that in the last thirty years,
practically everyone in the West is able to see footage of events from
almost anywhere, and this footage is invariably misleading, even though it
is apparently so compelling and “realistic.” However, Baudrillard is wrong
30. Mike Featherstone calls for precisely this in “In Pursuit of the Postmodern: an
Introduction,” in Theory, Culture and Society 5, Nos. 2-3 (1988), p. 207.
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to leap to the conclusion that reality is obliterated by the television screen.
Television does not create an entirely false reality either in its repre-
sentation of the world or with its reception by viewers. Television cover-
age is informed by the understandings and interpretations of the society to
which it broadcasts and by those who work in it. Thus, any footage is an
interpretation of the world according to a particular culture and, conse-
quently, it is necessarily limited. Programmers try to render this interpre-
tation of the world as compelling as possible to attract viewers and to
sustain their claims, but those images are always and necessarily “social”;
they are the historical products of a particular culture. Then the images
are not free-floating, mere simulacra but, on the contrary, concrete moves
in a cultural practice. They refer not so much to the reality of the situa-
tions they portray but rather to the society to which they communicate
these images, and they only make sense to viewers insofar as viewers are
thoroughly embedded in that culture.
Similarly, television viewers do not regard these images as empty, ref-
erenceless and fragmentary. On the contrary, just as the creation of these
images is embedded in the intepretive practice of making sense of the
world, so the viewers try to interpret these images to make sense of their
world. Whether the program be a soap opera or news footage, viewers inter-
pret the images according to their cultural understandings31 — although
those understandings are under constant revision in order to make sense of
new information. Rather than becoming the primary and prior cultural fac-
tor in contemporary society, television is embedded in and dependent upon
pre-existing and historically produced understandings. Furthermore, the
footage does not exist above and beyond the lives of viewers but, as the
briefest autobiographical consideration will reveal, television is employed
as a resource, wherein new interpretations derived from its footage are used
in the renegotiation of social relations. Viewers discuss what they watch
and use what they see to make sense of their own lives. 
In the end, Baudrillard’s discussion of hyperreality degenerates into
technological determinism. As Raymond Williams has argued, technical
development always presupposes a social and political context in which
innovative technology is regarded as useful by particular groups, given
their self-understandings. Consequently, the development and use of
31. See, for instance, John Fiske and John Hartley, Reading Television (London:
Methuen, 1984); Stuart Hall, “Encoding/Decoding,” in Stuart Hall, ed., Culture, Media
and Language (London: Hutchinson, 1980); Mike Featherstone, Consumer Culture and
Postmodernism (London: Sage, 1991), pp. 5 and 11.
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any technology must always be analyzed in terms of the political reali-
ties which gave rise to it and in which it remains embedded. From this
opposition to technological determinism, Williams develops a critique
of cultural pessimism because, for him, the belief in technological
autonomy must lead critics into political quietism and pessimism. If
technology determines social development and emerges independently,
then political resistance is futile. In line with his claim that any techni-
cal development is always embedded in and employed in a social con-
text, Williams rejects this cultural and political pessimism by arguing
that, since technology is always social, it cannot only be resisted but,
more importantly, it is always potentially open to creative usage by
opposition groups.32
Williams’ insistence on the cultural embeddedness of television and
opposition to technological determinism has important implications for
Critical Theory in the postmodern era, and allows a re-application of Bau-
drillard’s early critique of capitalism to this later post-Fordist period. Just
as Baudrillard argued that the notion of the objectivity of labor was a cen-
tral political principle for the development of capitalism, because it
seemed to render the market system indisputable, so is the apparently
unstoppable development of brilliant new forms of technology in post-
Fordist society employed to legitimate the contemporary political eco-
nomic order and obviate political discontent and debate. The fantastic
development of new technologies seems to divide post-Fordist society
from all other social forms, demonstrating the indisputable superiority of
this society. In such an apparent technological utopia, political opposition
seems to become absurd and obsolete. Yet, despite its construction as an
objective, inevitable and utopian force, technology is as deeply political
and cultural as any previous capitalist cultural category and, therefore,
anything but inevitable and objective. Given his early writings, Baudril-
lard should have seen through this ideology of technology and not have
been tricked into pessimism by its utopian and monolithic representation.
He should have seen through the rhetoric of the objectivity of technologi-
cal development, just as he saw through claims about the objectivity of
the market system to see why certain groups would want to represent new
forms of technology in this way.
Had he immersed himself in the actual production and consumption of
new technological forms, such as television, whose practices undermine
32. Raymond Williams, Towards 2000 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), “Culture
and Technology,” pp. 128-151.
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the rhetoric of technological utopian determinism, it is doubtless that he
would have done so. Then, just as Baudrillard claimed that capitalism was
not a new political economy but only a symbolic system of exchange
which dare not speak its name, so he would have seen that televisual cul-
ture, despite its technological novelty, is an unoriginal interpretative and
symbolic social practice. Since these everyday practices and constructions
of social reality belie official hegemonic accounts of reality, the close
analysis of them offers a route to a genuinely oppositional critical posi-
tion. As Piccone has argued: “With the dogma of a monolithic modernity
engendering one particular self-referential cultural model no longer
encumbering critical thought, it may be possible to vindicate particularity,
specificity and otherness in really existing communities of people consti-
tuting their social reality through personal interaction and direct participa-
tion in most of the decisions affecting their life.”33 This engagement with
diverse popular practices is necessary if Critical Theory is to have a voice
in the post-Fordist order, but, true to the spirit of early Baudrillard (and
Adorno), this engagement with popular practices must never make the
error sometimes detectable in cultural studies of lapsing into a facile and
uncritical populism, which automatically legitimates anything these
groups choose to do.34 The popular practices with which Critical Theory
should engage must themselves be subjected to critique where popular
constructions of reality are themselves not assumed to be correct.
In light of the necessarily interpretive nature of supposedly hyper-
real culture, Baudrillard’s rejection of Critical Theory becomes unnec-
essary and incorrect. Instead of hypostatizing his own initial interpre-
tation of the emergence of television as a new cultural phenomenon,
Baudrillard should have taken his initial interpretation as a starting
point, which would have driven him to more detailed empirical research
by which his own understanding would be developed dialectically. Such
concrete research would have demonstrated to him the actual way in which
33. Paul Piccone, “From the New Left to the New Populism,” in Telos 101 (Fall,
1994), p. 189.
34. Although their work was often expressively critical and historical, The Birming-
ham Centre for Contemporary Cultural occasionally slipped into this kind of populism; see
John Clarke, “The Skinheads and the Magical Recovery of Community,” Tony Jefferson,
“The Cultural Responses of the Teds” in Resistance through Rituals, ed. by Stuart Hall and
Tony Jefferson (London: Harper Collins, 1976). More recent examples of this facile popu-
lism in contemporary cultural studies would include, The Adoring Audience (London:
Routledge, 1992), ed. by Lisa Lewis and Gerald Fine, Shared Fantasy (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago, 1983), Harold Jenkins, Textual Poachers (London: Routledge, 1992).
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individuals conceive and construct their social reality, rather than his taking
at face value commonsensical and hegemonic notions of social reality.35
Conclusion
Baudrillard’s career serves a useful and dual didactic purpose. It dem-
onstrates the path that Critical Theory and intellectuals should not take,
and points toward an effective critical stance. Consequently, although the
development of Baudrillard’s writing from the 1980s should be rejected,
he is an important figure in reconstructing the kind of Critical Theory
which might at least begin to be adequate to the emergence of a post-
Fordist global order. Critical Theory cannot be a dismissive or pessimistic
nihilism; it must engage with and learn from actual individuals and their
social practices in order to make itself aware of wider social reality
against hegemonic accounts of that reality. Being critical in the era of glo-
bal capitalism requires, therefore, not taking the shibboleths of this new
political-economic order seriously, but always deconstructing such asser-
tive claims through revealing how they deliberately misrepresent social
reality for explicitly political ends. The importance of Baudrillard lies in
the fact that he both demonstrates the most extreme symptoms of contem-
porary intellectual malaise and simultaneously provides the cure for that
disease. Although many other contemporary figures share the later Baud-
rillard’s nihilism, the writing of no other individual represents both criti-
cal and pessimistic moments quite so dramatically. It is in this contra-
diction that the lasting importance of Baudrillard’s work resides.
35. In place of hypostatized assertions, Baudrillard might have undertaken detailed
studies of the production and consumption of television, similar to those carried out by,
e.g., David Morley, The Nationwide Audience (London: British Film Institute, 1980);
Family Television (London: Comedia, 1986).
